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The Mojave Desert as
Grounds for Change:




By Kelley J. Hart&
Because most available surface water
sources have already been exploited, Califor-
nians have increasingly relied upon ground-
water and are pressuring policymakers to
devise creative solutions using groundwater
to meet the thirsty state's demand for water.
However, many groundwater basins in Cali-
fornia have already been severely overdrafted.
California's groundwater depletion problem
is two-fold: one of both supply and demand.
First, groundwater is often extracted at the
cost of long-term basin sustainability. Sec-
ond, groundwater demand reflects wasteful
consumption habits by Californians. Al-
though inflated water demand is a serious is-
sue, this paper seeks to address only
problems of groundwater supply.
California law governing the state's 450
known groundwater basins does not ade-
quately recognize the scientific complexity of
groundwater that gives it persistent com-
mons' attributes.' In some situations, a com-
mons' tragedy can be avoided by imposition
of a private property system. However, be-
cause the common law-based private prop-
erty system in groundwater remains plagued
by uncertainty, this precious natural resource
is now partially depleted and contaminated.
Moreover, the California legislature has basi-
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UCLA School of Law; candidate for M.A. in Urban Planning,
UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research; I.D.,
UCLA School of Law, 2002; B.A. Dartmouth College, 1997. 1
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1. For an explanation of the "tragedy of the com-
mons," see infra Part II.A.
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cally ignored the needs of its groundwater ba-
sins.
2
Recent events concerning the Mojave
Desert highlight the dire need for ground-
water rights clarification. First, the California
Supreme Court rejected a trial court's physi-
cal solution 3 to bind parties claiming ambig-
uous rights to extract groundwater. 4 Water
extraction continues unchecked 'by basin
users who have opted out of the stipulated
judgment. Second, the Metropolitan Water
District ("MWD") has seriously considered
partnering with Cadiz, Inc. ("Cadiz") on a con-
junctive use and water marketing project to
exploit the aquifer beneath Cadiz's property. 5
Much of the land overlying the aquifer system
is treasured national park and wilderness set
aside to protect rare and endangered plant
and animal species. Cadiz proposes to artifi-
cially add and remove water from the aquifer,
jeopardizing the natural balance of the neigh-
boring desert ecosystem in the process. To
prevent overdrafting this groundwater basin
and others, usufructuary rights must be clari-
fied before anyone initiates projects of this
sort.
Only a statewide approach can address
the hydrologic system of surface and ground-
water flows that interchange above and below
the ground irrespective of municipal and
county boundaries. Since the common law
cannot resolve the crisis, the legislature must
speak through statute. But because claims
are highly individualized, a catered, quasi-ju-
2. California's new water planning legislation, Senate
Bill 221, Senate Bill 610 and Assembly Bill 901, do not be-
gin to resolve the state water shortage. While legislators
should be commended for attempting to add a layer of ac-
countability to urban water use supply with this recent leg-
islation, they unfortunately get no closer to a long-term
solution. Each bill essentially requires that large-scale
project developers locate a water supply for future inhabi-
tants. This legislation addresses neither the problem of
supply nor of demand, instead putting the onus improperly
on the middleman, the water agency. There is still no in-
centive for individuals to reduce consumption and no in-
centive for pumpers to reduce overdrafting. Instead, there
is more incentive to pressure water agencies to provide
more water.
3. A "physical solution" is an arrangement between
parties "fashioned when the strict application of water
rights in a case will result in waste and some other appro-
priation of water would protect vested rights and prevent
waste." JEFFREY S. ASHLEY AND ZACHARY A. SMITH, GROUND-
dicial solution is also necessary. The Califor-
nia legislature should require the
adjudication of rights in each basin. The stat-
ute must detail central recordkeeping and en-
forcement mechanisms to assure that
groundwater allocation rights are respected.
Although this proposal will not entirely re-
solve the water supply crisis, it will stabilize
groundwater resources, which constitute 30%
of the state's applied water source.
6
Part I of this paper describes ground-
water resources in California, as well as the
science and state law governing groundwater.
Part 11 argues that groundwater supply
problems, namely overdraft, can only be
solved by state legislation mandating adjudi-
cation of all claims to water use in Califor-
nia's groundwater basins. 7 Part II proposes a
statewide system for adjudication and com-
prehensive groundwater management.
Part I
A. Water in California, Where Supply Can't
Meet Demand
Californians already demand more water
than is available. Average annual water use
in 1995 was 79.5 million acre-feet ("maf"), 8 a
level of demand that exceeded supply by 1.6
maf.9 Urban, agricultural, and environmental
users procured water from the following
sources: 65.1 maf from surface water, 12.5
maf from groundwater, and 0.3 maf from re-
WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 45 (University of Nebraska
Press 1999).
4. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 cal. 4th
1224 (2000).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFOR-
NIA WATER PLAN UPDATE BULLETIN 160-98, ES3-5 (1998), availa-
ble at http://rubicon.water.ca.gov/bI60index.html.
7. Rights to water in fifteen basins have been adjudi-
cated under our common law system. See infra note 102.
8. To visualize one acre-foot of water, imagine one
acre of land covered by one foot of water. One acre-foot is
approximately 326,000 gallons. According to 1995 average
water demand projections, urban uses demanded 8.8 maf,
agriculture required 33.8 maf, and environmental uses re-
quired 36.9 maf. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RE-
SOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5-2 (Table ES5-1).
9. Id.
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cycling and desalinization processes.' 0
Groundwater supplies about 30% of the
state's urban and agrarian water needs.''
The California Department of Water Re-
sources ("Department") recognizes that many
groundwater basins are already overdrafted,
but believes that statewide groundwater over-
draft will not increase by 2020. By 1980, the
Department had already identified 42 over-
drafted groundwater basins.' 2 About 1.5 maf!
year were overdrafted by 1995.13 The Depart-
ment expects overdraft to decline to 1. 1 maf/
year by 202014 even though the state's popu-
lation will likely increase by 15 million people
over the same period, with an estimated de-
mand of an additional 3.2 maf of water each
year.' 5 The Department projects that in-
creased demand will be met, in part, by ex-
tracting an additional 165,000 acre-feet of
groundwater, presumably from basins that
can spare the water and still maintain a safe
yield. 16
Pressure to extract more water from aq-
uifers will also increase because California
must find a substitute source for almost
800,000 acre-feet/year of Colorado River
water. California has historically diverted as
much as 5.2 maf from the Colorado River an-
10. Id.
1I. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, CRIT-
ICAL WATER SHORTAGE CONTINGENCY PLAN 1-4 (December 29,
2000).
12. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 39.
13. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra
note 6, at ES3-7 (Table ES3-2).
14. Id.
15. Id. at ES5-3.
16. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra
note 6, at ES3-5 (Table ES3-1) and ES3-7 (Table ES3-2).
Overdraft occurs when the amount of groundwater ex-
tracted from the aquifer is greater than the amount of
water replenishing the aquifer. DAVID H. GETCHES. WATER
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 239 (West Publishing Co. 1997). Over-
draft is measured as a long-term trend, and should not re-
flect the annual difference between extraction and recharge
from natural fluctuations between drought and flood years.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at
ES3-5. Negative effects of overdrafting are discussed infra
Part I.C.
17. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra
note 11, at 2-4.
18. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580 (1963)
(The Act devised a numeric allocation, but permitted Ari-
nually,' 7 although technically entitled to only
4.4 maf under the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, according to the Supreme Court in Ari-
zona v. California.'8 Pursuant to the Colorado
River Interim Surplus Guidelines issued Janu-
ary 25, 2001, California has until 2015 to re-
duce its diversions from 5.2 maf to 4.4 maf.19
.The Department expects that void will be fil-
led with surface water from the Central Valley
Project and State Water Project, in addition
to increased extraction from groundwater ba-
sins.20 There are 450 known groundwater ba-
sins in California containing up to 850 million
acre-feet of water.2' Despite increased reli-
ance on this resource, the state does not reg-
ulate groundwater extraction.
B. The Science of Groundwater
The California Water Code defines
groundwater as "all water beneath the surface
of the earth within the zone below the water
table in which the soil is completely satu-
rated with water, but does not include water
which flows in known and definite chan-
nels."22 The law distinguishes percolating
water from that which flows in underground
streams, 23 but water moving beneath the sur-
zona, California and Nevada, the Lower Basin states, to se-
lect different terms if agreed upon by state compact.).
19. See Department of the Interior, Record of Decision:
Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, Final Environ-
mental Impact Statement, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,772-7,782 (2001).
20. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, supra
note 6, at ES5-2.
21. ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA
WATER 2 (1995); State Water Resources Control Board,
Ground Water in California 2 at www.swrcb.ca.gov/general/
publications/docs/ground-water.pdf (last visited May 6,
2002).
22. CAL. WATER CODE § 10752(a) (Deering 2001).
23. Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 617-18
(1899); Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 126
Cal. 486, 494 (1899) ("It is essential to the nature of perco-
lating waters that they do not form part of the body or flow,
surface or subterranean, of any stream. They may either be
rain waters which are slowly infiltrating through the soil, or
they may be waters seeping through the banks or bed of a
stream which have so far left the bed and the other waters
as to have lost their character as part of the flow.")
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face is more complicated than the law sug-
gests.
In the natural hydrologic cycle, "some of
Ithel water that falls to the earth's surface will
seep into the ground and be pulled down-
ward by gravity until it reaches a depth where
the subsurface is saturated with water.
'" 24
This level is the water table, and groundwater
flows beneath it.25  Groundwater moves
within the geologic formation beneath the
water table, in both confined and unconfined
aquifers. 26 In a confined aquifer, water is
under pressure because it is overlaid by im-
permeable rock or clay through which it can-
not pass. 27  In contrast, water in an
unconfined aquifer can move from the water
table to the base of the aquifer because there
is no impermeable geologic material to
thwart its passage.
28
Aquifers are often hydrologically con-
nected to each other and to surface water.29
The locational flow of water will vary depend-
ing on the water level in each system. 30
Water will percolate from a system of higher
elevation down to the base water table
level. 3I Groundwater moves slower than sur-
face water because groundwater is usually
traveling through the pores of geologic for-
mations. 32 There is immense variation in po-
rosity between and within geologic
formations. Higher porosity means that more
water can be stored in the rock.33 Permeabil-
ity corresponds to the size of pores and de-
24. Erik Swenson, Public Trust Doctrine and Groundwater
Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363, 372 (1999).
25. id.
26. id.
27. Id. n.78 (citing C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY
5, 101-02 (2d ed. 1988)); Ella Foley-Gannon, Institutional Ar-
rangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and
Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 279 (2000).
28. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372 n.78.
29. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Swenson, supra note 24, at 372.
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id.
35. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27.
scribes "the ease through which water flows
through a geologic formation. '34 There are
comparatively large gaps through which the
water can pass in sand and gravel so it is
characterized as having high porosity and
high permeability.
35
C. Groundwater Quality and Quantity in
California Today
The percolation process normally filters
out contaminants in water as it moves
through the strata of geologic formations.
However, groundwater will transport certain
types of contaminants in soil saturated with
chemicals. As a result, a number of California
aquifers are contaminated by pesticides and
other agricultural by-products.36 Some have
been degraded by salt water intrusion and
others by industrial chemicals. As a result,
the quality of the groundwater depends not
only on the quality of water percolating from
the surface, but also on what is already de-
posited in the sediments through which the
water passes.
37
As mentioned in the first section, at least
forty-two of California's groundwater basins
are already overdrafted. 38  There are many
negative consequences of overdrafting an aq-
uifer. First, because the water table drops,
extractors must dig deeper wells and pump-
ing becomes more expensive.39  Second,
when an aquifer is overdrawn for an extended
period, the water-bearing geologic formations
36. Jodie T. Raccio, Agricultural Use of Pesticides: Farmer
and Manufacturer Liability for Groundwater Contamination, 3 ALB.
L.J. SCa. & TECH. 185, 187 (1993) (citing PATRICK W. HOLDEN,
PESTICIDES AND GROUNDWATER QUALITY - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
IN FOUR STATES 4 (1986)).
37. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 280.
38. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 39.
39. See Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Ground-
water Export Legislation in California: Lessons from a Patchwork
Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 657, 660 (1994); Benjamin R.
Vance, Comment, Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to
Groundwater Protection, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 803, 804-805 (1996);
GETCHES, supra note 16, at 246 (describing the increased
costs of extracting water from greater depths); Susan Batty
Peterson, Designation and Protection of Critical Groundwater Ar-
eas, 1991 BYU L. Rev 1393, 1398 (1991); Barton H. Thomp-
son, Jr., Water Allocation and Protection: A United States Case
Study, EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND ISSUES 476, 488-489
(W.G. Ernst ed., 2000); Sandra Postel, When the world's wells
Run Dry, WORLD WATCH 30, 33 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (describing
Kelley J. Hart
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are compacted. The land is pulled downward,
causing subsidence at the surface. 40  One
area of the Santa Clara Valley subsided 28
feet between 1933 and 196741 and some parts
of the San Joaquin Valley have subsided 30
feet because of groundwater overdrafting.4
2
Third, vegetation above an overdrafted aqui-
fer is likely to die as the surface is "deserti-
fied." 43 Finally, salt-water intrusion
irreversibly contaminates aquifers near the
coast .
4 4
D. California's Groundwater Law
Responsibility for groundwater protec-
tion has been left to the individual states.
45
In California, the right to use groundwater is
a real property right.46 The state law pertain-
ing to groundwater rights has largely devel-
oped through common law, but the California
Constitution and the California Water Code
also provide some limited directives.
how increased pumping costs has driven some ground-
water users to abandon pumping.).
40. Peterson, supra note 39, at 1395; Thompson, supra
note 39, at 489.
41. Christopher B Amandes, Controlling Land Surface
Subsidence. A Proposal for a Market Based Regulatory Scheme, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1208, 1213 (1984).
42. State Water Resources Control Board, supra note
21; ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 40; TERRY L. ANDERSON,
WATER CRIsIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 99 (The Johns Hop-
kins University Press 1983).
43. Thompson, supra note 39, at 489; Deborah Moore
and Zach Willey, Water in the American West: Institutional Evolu-
tion and Environmental Restoration in the 21st Century, 62 U COLO.
L. REV. 775, 776-780 (1991) (describing the environmental
drought generally, without distinguishing groundwater
from surface water depletion).
44. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 40; Peterson, supra
note 39, at 1397; Thompson, supra note 39, at 489.
45. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER
POLLUTION: MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON PREVENTION IN EPA's
EFFORTS TO PROTECT GROUNDWATER 13 (1991) (stating that
"lbloth EPA and the states agree that the primary responsi-
bility for protecting groundwater belongs to the states").
46. Note that this is a usufructuary right, which
means it is a right to use water, not an ownership right in
groundwater per se. ERIN SCHILLER & ELIZABETH FOWLER, END -
ING CALIFORNIA'S WATER CRISIS 33 (Pacific Research Institute
1999).
47. Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law:
The Development of The California Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 1. LEGAL
STUD. 159, 162 (1998).
1. judge-Made Law
When California became a state in 1850,
the California legislature adopted English
common law and repealed all laws of Spanish
and Mexican origin governing the land except
those stipulated in the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo.47 Among the few rights they pre-
served were Pueblo water rights, which are the
rights of a municipal successor to a Spanish/
Mexican pueblo to reasonable and beneficial
use of the water underlying the historic
pueblo. 48 Apart from Pueblo rights, Califor-
nia courts followed English common law to
adjudicate water disputes.49 As such, courts
initially applied the absolute ownership rule, giv-
ing landowners the right to unlimited extrac-
tion of water beneath their land regardless of
negative impacts on neighboring ground-
water users. 50 The landowner's right to pump
the water beneath her land is called an overly-
ing right.
51
48. ScoTT S. SLATER, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW AND POLICY,
Vol. I, 5-3 (Butterworth Legal Publishers 2001); see also Ke-
vin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Ground-
water Laws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123, 140 n.143 (1994) (for a
description of their origin and cases addressing Pueblo
rights).
49. English common law distinguishes surface water
from groundwater. For surface water disputes, courts ap-
plied the riparian principle that landowners who lived adja-
cent to surface water are entitled to use it, and their rights
are derived from their use of the water. Kanazawa, supra
note 47, at 163. The right "is usufructuary, and consists not
so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use." Id.
Courts later adopted a "no-injury" rule. The California Su-
preme Court explained that, "lal riparian proprietor, while
he has the undoubted right to use the water flowing over
his land, must use it as to do the least possible harm to
other riparian proprietors." Id. at 164 (quoting Crandall v.
Woods, 8 Cal. 136, 141 (1857)). Then California courts rec-
ognized a right of prior appropriation to surface water.
Mark Kanazawa argues that courts created prior appropria-
tion rights to address gold miners' needs to divert and use
non-riparian water in California. Id. at 165. Subsequently
the court grappled with employing a riparian and appropri-
ation system simultaneously for surface water, giving ripa-
rian owners priority and the right to transfer their interests
to appropriators. Id. at 168-172.
50. 62 Cal. lur. 3d § 394 (1981).
51. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224 (2000) ("lAin overlying right . . . is the owner's
right to take water from the ground underneath for use on
his land within the basin or watershed; the right is based
on ownership of land and is appurtenant thereto.") (quot-
Fall 2002
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In the 1903 case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the
California Supreme Court abandoned the
doctrine of absolute ownership and imposed
the correlative rights doctrine.5 2 Under this rule,
overlying users hold in common the right to
use the groundwater for reasonable and ben-
eficial use of the aquifer's safe yield. 53 All
overlying landowners hold this right, irrespec-
tive of whether they withdraw groundwater.
54
Extracting up to the safe yield means remov-
ing only as much water as will be recharged
into the aquifer.5 5 If users withdraw more
water than the safe yield, then all overlying
users must reduce their use to a fair and just
proportion relative to the other overlying
users. 56 When there is surplus water, it may
be appropriated by others who do not have
overlying rights.
5 7
Besides Pueblo and overlying rights, the
courts recognize two other types of rights in
groundwater usage. An appropriation right is
the right to extract groundwater surplus to
that needed by overlying users and transport
it to land that does not overlie the ground-
water basin from which it was extracted. 58 To
get appropriation rights, one merely with-
draws the surplus water and puts it to benefi-
cial use.5 9 A prescriptive right is gained by
pumping continuously for the prescription
period when prior rights-holders have notice
and there is no surplus water in the basin.60
There are priorities between and among
the rightholders. Pueblo rights trump all
other claims of use.6 1 The other three are pri-
oritized as follows:
ing California Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham &
Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 725 (1964)).
52. LITrLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 21, at 49.
53. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 144 (1903).
54. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 45.
55. ANNE SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
99 (Governor's Comm'n to Review Cal. Water Rights Law,
Staff Paper No. 2. 1977).
56. Katz, 141 Cal. at 134-36; ANDERSON, supra note 42,
at 97; 62 Cal. Jur. 3d § 401 (1981).
57. Katz, 141 Cal. at 135-36.
58. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 285.
59. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 7-8.
IBletween overlying users, no tempo-
ral priority exists. Rather, in times of
shortage, each is entitled to a reason-
able share of the common supply. As
between appropriators, temporal pri-
ority exists; the rights of a pumper
first in time are senior to those of a
later appropriator. As between over-
lying users and appropriators, overly-
ing users have priority, regardless of
the date of the inception of the over-
lying use. Prescriptive rights-holders
can quantify their rights as against
both prior appropriators and overly-
ing owners under formulas developed
by the courts.
62
In sum, the appropriator's use is limited to
the amount of the surplus water in the
groundwater basin. If there is no surplus
water, the appropriator is not entitled to take
any water, unless he has acquired prescrip-
tive rights.
6 3
Three key cases have further defined
groundwater law in California. The first arose
after the Raymond Basin was overdrafted for
more than twenty years. In Pasadena v. Alham-
bra, the California Supreme Court imposed
use limits to reduce extraction to the basin's
safe yield. 64 Rather than ascertain the overly-
ing and appropriative rights of each party, the
Court reasoned that because the basin had
been overdrafted for so many years, all par-
ties had developed mutually prescriptive
rights against all others and each must re-
duce their use proportionate to the quantity
they had acquired by prescription.6 5  The
Court determined the prescriptive quantity by
looking at each pumper's annual average ex-
60. To gain a prescriptive right, use must be (1) rea-
sonable and beneficial, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile
and adverse, (4) continuous and uninterrupted for five
years, and (5) exclusive and under a claim of right. City of
Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199. 281-82 (1975).
61. SLATER, supra note 48, at 5-3.
62. Gregory S. Weber, Forging A More Coherent Ground-
water Policy in California: State and Federal Constitutional Law
Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1994).
63. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d
908, 926-27 (1949).
64. id. at 929.
65. Id. at 928-933.
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traction for the five years preceding the law-
suit.
After Pasadena v. Alhambra was decided in
1949, the mutual prescription doctrine 66 facil-
itated negotiations because parties could cal-
culate individual extraction formulations
based on recent use that became binding
when incorporated into the Court's judgment
instead of grappling over figures based on ab-
stract overlying and appropriation rights.
67
As one commentator noted, "Ibly agreeing to
apply a formula, the parties have avoided ad-
versary proceedings in many situations where
determination of complex appropriative pri-
orities might in any event be impossible be-
cause of the insufficient and unreliable
data."
68
Mutual prescription's utility declined,
however, after City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando. The California Supreme Court an-
nounced that the notice requirement of pre-
scriptive rights is not met simply by the
lowering of the water table, despite the Al-
hambra Court's finding that a lowered water
table provides notice because it is over-
draft.69 The San Fernando Court redefined
overdraft to be long term decline of the water
table, excluding natural fluctuations.70 The
court also declared that prescriptive rights
cannot be gained against public entities.
71
So mutual prescription does not exist when a
public entity is party to an adjudication.
72
The San Fernando Court also critiqued the
equitable apportionment remedy lower
66. The mutual prescription doctrine is the concept
developed by the Pasadena Court that all basin extractors
can simultaneously establish prescriptive rights against
one another when a basin is overdrafted through the pre-
scriptive statutory period because all pumpers have ex-
tracted water contrary to the preexisting rights of one
another for that period. Once extractors' rights are per-
ceived as mutually prescriptive, courts may determine indi
vidual extraction limits by looking at each extractor's
historical use during the prescriptive period. GETCHES,
supra note 16, at 250.
67. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 23-24.
68. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 46-47 (oUOTING
MARYBELLE D. ARCHIBALD, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALI-
FORNIA 23-24 (Governor's Comm'n to Review California
Water Rights Law 1977).
69. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 282. ("The commence-
ment of overdraft provides the element of adversity which
courts often employed after finding mutual
prescription. The Court said, "[a true equita-
ble apportionment would take into account
many more factors."73  In footnote 61, the
Court noted that the United States Supreme
Court equitably apportioned water in Nebraska
v. Wyoming, and further stated:
[aIpportionment calls for the exercise
of an informed judgment on a consid-
eration of many factors. Priority of
appropriation is the guiding principle.
But physical and climatic conditions,
the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the char-
acter and rate of return flows, the ex-
tent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the prac-
tical effect of wasteful uses on down-
stream areas, the damage to
upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a lim-
itation is imposed on the former -
these are all relevant factors. They
are merely an illustrative, not an ex-
haustive catalogue.74
The San Fernando Court's emphasis on order-
ing priorities when determining equitable ap-
portionment suggests that even when all
parties to the action are private individuals, a
court cannot get around characterizing priori-
ties by finding mutual prescription.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed
the groundwater priority rights system in City
of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,75 unani-
mously holding that "although it is clear that
makes the first party's taking an invasion constituting a ba-
sis for injunctive relief to the other party. But if the other
party is not on notice that the overdraft exists, such adverse
taking does not cause the commencement of the prescrip-
tive period.").
70. Id. at 280.
71. Id. at 270-77 (interpreting a 1968 amendment to
California Civil Code § 1007 to create a broad prohibition
on obtaining prescription against water that is, in the
words of the statute, "dedicated to a public use.").
72. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 31-32.
73. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 265.
74. Id. at 265 n.61.
75. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224 (2000).
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a trial court may impose a physical solution
to achieve a practical allocation of water to
competing interests, the solution's general
purpose cannot simply ignore the priority
rights of the parties asserting them."76 The
court further directed that "a court may
neither change priorities among the water
rights holders nor eliminate vested rights in
applying the solution without first consider-
ing them in relation to the reasonable use
doctrine."77 In City of Barstow, the trial court
had enforced a physical solution that set an
annual production limit for each party based
on prior use with no consideration for preex-
isting legal water rights. 78 The trial court rea-
soned that "the doctrine of reasonable and
beneficial use, as established by Article X,
Section 2 of the California Constitution, re-
quired an equitable apportionment of all
rights when a basin is in overdraft."79 The Su-
preme Court disagreed, insisting that "Iciase
law simply does not support applying an eq-
uitable apportionment to water use claims
unless all claimants have correlative rights;
for example, when parties establish mutual
prescription."80  The California Supreme
Court upheld the appellate court's disposi-
tion that parties may stipulate, to a physical
solution not based on their legal priorities if
they agree to waive their existing water
rights, 8 1 but the rights of non-stipulating par-
ties are not affected by the stipulated judg-
76. Id. at 1250.
77. Id. at 1237.
78. Id. at 1235-36.
79. Id. at 1238.
80. Id. at 1248.
81. Id. at 1256 n.17.
82. Id. at 1253, 1256 (The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate court decision that the physical solu-
tion may bind stipulating parties, but the Cardozo
appellants, a non-stipulating party, still have their overly-
ing rights protected.).
83. After this decision, a trial court may impose a
physical solution based on prior use instead of legal priori-
ties, so long as it first finds that mutual prescription exists.
After San Fernando, in order to find mutual prescription, the
basin must be suffering from overdraft for at least five con-
secutive years with notice to users and a public agency has
not reserved a legal priority in the basin.
84. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 45. The amend-
ment was inspired by concerns for surface water, but the
ment.8 2  Prior use may still be a common
method of resolving disputes if parties stipu-
late to using it, but City of Barstow may slow
pre-judgment negotiation of water rights be-
cause parties will not be bound to commit to
a physical solution based on prior use unless
mutual prescription has been established.8 3
2. California Statute-Based Law
In response to real and threatened de-
pletion of water sources, the California Con-
stitution was amended in 1928 by citizen
initiative. 84 Article X, Section 2 declares that
"Itlhe right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this state is and shall be limited to
such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such
right does and shall not extend to the waste
or unreasonable method of diversion." The
amendment reinforces the correlative rights
doctrine's reasonable and beneficial use re-
quirement.85
The California legislature has not yet de-
fined property rights in groundwater use.
There is very little state law governing
groundwater.86 California Water Code Sec-
tion 2100 authorizes the State Water Re-
sources Control Board ("SWRCB") to police
the use of water in the state, but does not
require it.8 7 The Water Code also gives the
California Supreme Court later held that it also applied to
groundwater. See, e.g., Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d.
351, 367 (1935).
85. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 77-78. judicial deter-
minations of what is reasonable and beneficial use varies.
Whether or not a court restricts use may depend on the
perceived scarcity of water at the time of the suit. Tulare
Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal.
2d 489, 567 (1935). Some courts give great weight to the
"ever increasing need for the conservation of water in this
state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its ex-
press recognition in the 1928 amendment." Joslin v. Marin
Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d. 132, 140 (1967).
86. There are a few state statutes addressing ground-
water contamination, but they will not be addressed here
as groundwater quality is beyond the scope of this paper.
87. The SWRCB can initiate a basin adjudication to
prevent destruction or irreparable injury to groundwater
quality. CAL. WATER CODE § 2100 (Deering 2001).
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SWRCB power to referee adjudication of
groundwater rights and investigate matters
pertaining to adjudication of rights upon a
court's request. 88 In Imperial Irrigation District v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., a California
Appellate Court found that SWRCB may de-
clare standards of reasonable use.89
The legislature has also established
groundwater extraction monitoring require-
ments, but they only apply to four counties in
the state.90 Individuals who extract more
than twenty-five acre-feet of water each year
from any basin in Riverside, San Bernardino,
Los Angeles, or Ventura County must file a
"Notice of Extraction and Diversion of Water"
with the SWRCB. 9' If an extractor does not
file a notice of her location and quantity of
pumping, her use is not recognized under the
law.
9 2
The legislature has passed many bills to
facilitate local groundwater management.
For example, the California Water Code in-
cludes a number of special district acts. Each
act creates a specific geographic groundwater
management district with enumerated func-
tions.93  The legislature authorizes special
districts to perform an array of functions,
such as determining groundwater capacity,
managing flow in and out of its basins, set-
ting quotas for use when the basins are over-
drafted, and prosecuting unreasonable
users.94 The legislature has also authorized
various types of water districts (agencies),
88. CAL. WATER CODE § 2000 (Deering 2001).
89. 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 561 (1990).
90. See CAL. WATER CODE § 4999-5008 (Deering 2001).
91. Id. at §§ 4999, 5001.
92. Id. at § 5004. The statute imposes no other penal-
ties, except that under § 5003 the extractor cannot gain a
prescription right against others.
93. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE App. §§ 118-101 to 118-
901 established the Monterey Peninsula Water Manage-
ment District in Monterey County. For a list of other spe-
cific districts, see Eric L. Garner, Michelle Ouellette, and
Richard L. Sharff, Jr., Institutional Reforms in California Ground-
water Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021, 1033 n.114 (1994).
94. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 291-293.
95. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 43; Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Mar-
kets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673, 697 n.80 (1993) (providing a list of
sources that discuss success of these districts): see also CALI-
which may levy taxes, issue bonds, set service
rates, and participate in litigation affecting
users in their jurisdiction. 95 Assembly Bill
3030 grants these local agencies the right to
adopt groundwater management plans, but
not the right to make binding determinations
of individuals' water rights.96 Approximately
150 agencies have adopted groundwater
management plans pursuant to AB 3030.
9 7
Cities and counties may use their police
power to regulate groundwater by ordinance
as long as there is no conflict with state law.
98
About 30% of California's counties adopted
groundwater ordinances, usually requiring a
conditional use permit before water can be
exported from the county of origin. 99
E. Groundwater Basin Adjudication in
Practice
Competing rights for groundwater are
generally not adjudicated until after a
groundwater basin becomes overdrafted. A
senior appropriator or overlying right-holder
typically brings an action against a junior ap-
propriator, seeking an injunction to halt the
junior appropriator's use. To set the order of
priority, the court must then characterize
each extractor's use. "One product of the ad-
judication is judicial determination of the na-
ture and quantity of each groundwater user's
share of the basin's safe yield."'100
After rights are adjudicated, the court
typically appoints a watermaster, who then
FORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN No. 155-94,
GENERAL COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WATER DISTRICT ACTS (1994)
(list of all general and special districts created by the Cali-
fornia legislature).
96. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10750- 10755.4 (West 2001)
(for terms of groundwater management plans); see also Gar-
ner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1032. Section
10753.8(b) does not authorize agencies to make binding
determinations of individual users' rights.
97. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL. supra
note 11, at 2-7; see also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RE-
SOURCES, GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA: A REPORT
TO THE LEGISLATURE 9-11 (1999).
98. Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 31 Cal. App. .4th
166, 175 (1994).
99. GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra
note 11, at 2-7.
100. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 286.
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manages the quantity of water in the basin.
The court may give the watermaster authority
to devise methods to prevent overdraft, and
the watermaster may petition to have other
responsibilities, such as oversight of water
quality. The court usually reserves the right
to review its order when conditions
change.101 Sixteen groundwater basins in
California have been adjudicated.1
0 2
Adjudication of all four basins in the San
Gabriel watershed illustrates how the process
of arriving at effective management varies.
(1) The Raymond Basin is governed by adju-
dication from the famous San Fernando case
discussed supra, Part I.D.I. Assigned pump-
ing rights limit the amount of extraction to
safe yield. However, the maximum annual
extraction figure was adjusted once because
the original estimate of safe yield was too
low.10 3 A board serves as the watermaster to
monitor pumping and the basin's condition.
Water producers bear the costs of administer-
ing this system.' 0 4 (2) Initially, a water dis-
trict tried to manage the West Basin without
first adjudicating individuals' extraction
rights. 10 5  When that failed, water users
sought to clarify their rights via adjudica-
tion.' 06 Now a California Department of Re-
sources field office serves as the basin
watermaster and assures that the West Basin
is artificially replenished 10 7  because the
rights assigned exceed the natural safe yield.
However, pumpers pay taxes to cover these
101. Id. at 289.
102. In order of final court adjudication, these basins
are: 1944 Raymond Basin, 1958 Cucamonga Basin, 1961
West Coast Basin; 1965 Central Basin: 1966 Santa Marga-
rita River Watershed; 1969 San Bernardino Basin; 1972
Cummings Basin; 1973 Tehachapi Basin; 1973 Main San
Gabriel Basin; 1977 Warren Valley Basin; 1978 Chino Basin;
1979 Upper Los Angeles River Area; 1980 Scott River Sys-
tem; 1985 Puente; 1996 Santa Paula Basin, and 1998
Mojave Basin. See Ronald Kaiser, Deep Trouble: Options for
Managing The Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEx,
TECH L. REV. 249, 280 n.159 (2001). The Mojave Basin is not
on this list since appealing groundwater users are not
bound by the stipulated judgment of the lower court.
103. William Blomquist, Institutions for Managing
Groundwater Basins in Southern California, WATER OUANTITY/
QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 43, 46 (Ariel
Dinar and Edna Tusak Loehman eds., Praeger Publishers
1995).
104. id.
services. 10 8 (3) The Central Basin was also
adjudicated after a water district could not
solve overdraft problems. The Central Basin
is currently managed and replenished much
like the West Basin. 10 9 (4) Similarly, a water
district was first created for the Main San
Gabriel Basin, and eventually rights were ad-
judicated." 0 The basin's safe yield is set
each year and each party is entitled to extract
a share of the safe yield. Overpumping is
taxed and that revenue is used to purchase
water to replenish the basin.'"
Part Ii
A. Why Adjudication?
Overdraft and depletion can be pre-
vented by controlling extraction from the
groundwater basin. But how can extraction
be checked when it is unclear who has a right
to withdraw water? The current system of
groundwater law is fraught with uncer-
tainty. ' 2  The California Supreme Court
warned that uncertainty "inhibits long range
planning and investment for the development
and use of waters . '.'..113 The California leg-
islature declared that "the efficient use of
water requires certainty in the definition of
property rights to the use of water."' 14 As one
author noted, "Iclurrently, groundwater users
have very uncertain ideas of what their re-
spective rights are if the basin has not been
adjudicated. The state of the law prevents
fulfillment of the constitutional requirement
105. Id.
106. Id. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County's judgment. Califor-
nia Water Service Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc.,
224 Cal. App. 2d 715 (1964).
107. Artificial replenishment entails importing surface
water to spreading basins to percolate into the aquifer be-
neath.
108. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 46-47.
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at 48.
111. Id.
112. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1028.
113. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System,
25 Cal. 3d 339, 355 (1979).
114. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.5(a) (Deering 2001).
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that water be put to reasonable and benefi-
cial use."''1
5
For a number of reasons, it is imperative
that adjudication of user rights be the first
major groundwater law reform. First, the past
sixty years of institutional experimentation in
California demonstrate that adjudication is
the necessary first step toward groundwater
management. Only the rights-adjudicated
basins in California are effectively managed.
Second, groundwater is a commons problem
that can only be solved by a private entitle-
ment system. Third, public-private partner-
ships for conjunctive use and private markets
in water rights are unlikely to be sustainable
practices until groundwater ownership is
clearly defined.
The fact that all sustainable manage-
ment schemes in California today came about
only after rights to use the groundwater were
adjudicated suggests that adjudication is the
imperative first step to accomplishing a long-
term management scheme. Although the Or-
ange County Water District ("OCWD") is often
cited as an institutional solution to overdraft
without adjudication,' 1 6  because OCWD's
management practices are not sustainable, it
is not a model for developing a management
structure. Orange County created a water dis-
trict in 19331 17 that required every extractor to
register with the OCWD. 1 18 The district then
began monitoring all pumping and imposing
115. Michael P. Mallery. Groundwater: A Call for a Com-
prehensive Management Program. 14 PAC. L.J. 1279, 1290 (1983).
116- Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater
Dispute Resolution in California: A Glimpse at the Second Generation
of Groundwater Issues and How Agencies Work Towards Problem
Resolution, 20 PAC. L.I. 31, 63-64 (1988); ASHLEY & SMITH,
supra note 3, at 44.
117. CAL. UNCOD. WATER ACTS, Act 5683 (1933 Cal. Stat.
924). Although it was originally created in 1933, the district
was substantially altered by an amendment in 1953 that
authorized the OCWD to operate a replenishment program
and impose pumping taxes within its jurisdiction. 1953
Cal. Stat. 770.
118. Id. at § 24.
119. Two commentators have pointed out that the
OCWD approach ignores pre-existing priorities, thereby
eliminating any advantage of having a pre-existing right in
the basin groundwater. Nonetheless, the court dismissed
all possible constitutional claims resulting from this depri-
vation in Orange County Water District v. Fransworth, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 518 (1956), wherein it upheld the OCWD manage-
a tax on withdrawals to fund artificial replen-
ishment. There is no set pumping limit for
users." 9 The OCWD prevents overdrafting by
periodically measuring total extraction and
artificially replenishing the basin to compen-
sate for that loss. This system is not a sus-
tainable method of preventing overdraft since
it relies entirely on artificial recharge by im-
ported surface water from the Colorado River
and the Northern California State Project.'
20
The OCWD arrangement is also flawed be-
cause, absent defined and transferable pump-
ing rights, users have no incentive to move
from lesser to higher valued uses.'
2 1
Groundwater depletion is a "tragedy of
the commons." "Groundwater is a fugitive re-
source that is valuable only when it is cap-
tured; and we can expect groundwater basins
to be overexploited, like buffalo or whales."'
' 22
Rational pumpers using the resource believe
that continuing to withdraw groundwater is in
their best interest, even when extraction ex-
ceeds natural basin replenishment (thereby
resulting in long-term overdraft and all of its
consequences). Removing an additional unit
of water is perceived as a greater benefit than
the individual cost resulting from a slightly
lowered water table. 123 "Therein is the trag-
edy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his lusel ... without
limit - in a world that is limited."'
24
ment method. See George G. Grover & John F. Mann, Jr.,
Acton v. Blundell Revisisted: "Property" in California Ground-
water, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 596 (1991).
120. See Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Man-
agement: Three Case Studies and a "Market" Approach, 16 ENVTL. L.
797, 833 (1986).
121. WILLIAM BLOMOUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS 270 (ICS
Press 1992). See also Blomquist, supra note 103, at 57 (the
author argues that making allocations specific and trans-
ferable allows for smooth adjustments in water use).
122. Anderson, supra note 42, at 101.
123. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1285; Barton H.
Thompson, Ir., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 250 (2000) ("Unfortunately,
groundwater is ... a natural commons. Absent legal con-
straints, each user has an incentive to pump as much as he
or she needs, even when the cumulative result is a rapid
depletion or overdrafting of the groundwater aquifer.").
124. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
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A private property system can overcome
the tragedy of the groundwater commons be-
cause it can internalize the externalities, both
positive and negative, of extracting ground-
water.' 25 On the most fundamental level,
water users will not be able to extract ground-
water that someone else owns. 126 In addi-
tion, "lwlhen the effects of resource use are
fairly localized, private property better aligns
each owner's interests with the efficient level
of use because each owner faces the full costs
of overconsumption.' 2 7
But to create a private property system
in groundwater, "the sovereign needs identifi-
able units of property, just as the holders of
those units need sovereign activity, if renewa-
ble resources such as groundwater are to
continue their renewability."'128 The OCWD
management strategy mentioned above,
which was not premised on adjudication of
rights, has not resolved the "tragedy of the
commons" because users do not have owner-
ship shares that would give them incentives
to keep the basin's water supply sustainable.
"lElven if each pumper pays her pro rata
share of the increased costs, each continues
to have an incentive to go on pumping. The
solution is therefore not just to impose the
increased costs of pumping on all pumpers
pro rata, but to reduce total pumping."'129 In
order to enforce pro rata reductions when
overdraft is occurring, California's ground-
water law must clarify all claims of usufructu-
ary rights to the groundwater.1
30
Following the "reasonable and beneficial
use" mandate of the California Constitu-
125. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967) ("A primary function of
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a
greater internalization of externalities."); Anderson, supra
note 42, at 110 ("As the scarcity of surface water and
groundwater increases, privatizing the commons offers the
best hope of getting the highest value from these re-
sources.").
126. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 36.
127. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, I l I HARV. L. REV.
621. 678 (1998).
128. Earl F. Murphy, Some Legal Solutions for Contempo-
rary Problems Concerning Groundwater and Aquifers, 4 J. MIN. L. &
PoL'Y 49, 111 (1988).
tion,' 31 only rights to proportionate use should
be determined by adjudication. Allocating
absolute rights will only exacerbate the ground-
water commons tragedy. According to one
author:
Property rights can help solve the
tragedy of the commons when the
rights result in the effective internal-
ization of the cost of excessive har-
vesting, but property rights turn
harmful when they reinforce a sense
of entitlement to an unlimited harvest
• .. ITIhey... can ... cause resource
users, as a matter of fairness, to reject
out of hand even the suggestion that
they should reduce their current us-
age ... Moreover, property rights may
focus resource users on their individ-
ual interests rather than on total soci-
etal well being, undermining social
norms of cooperation and reinforcing
the very dichotomy between individ-
ual and social welfare that underlies
the tragedy of the commons.
32
There should be no misunderstanding about
the proportionate nature of rights when they
are adjudicated.
In addition, ascertaining proportionate
ownership in each basin is a logical prerequi-
site to commencing markets in water rights
and allowing private individuals to make con-
junctive use arrangements. Groundwater ex-
perts have long insisted that groundwater
banking not begin until rights have been clar-
ified. 1 33 But these pleas have been in vain, as
at least twelve conjunctive use projects are
129. Smith, supra note 120, at 810-11. Smith points
out other problems with the system, namely that users are
not paying the entire replacement cost since the surface
water obtained for replenishment is subsidized by the state
and federal governments and many users are exempt or
paying discounted replenishment and equity fees. Id. at
841.
130. Id. at 873-74 ("some kind of allocation is re-
quired, regardless of what the other groundwater manage-
ment scheme components ... may be..
131. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2.
132. Thompson, supra note 123, at 257.
133. James H. Krieger and Havey 0. Banks, Ground
Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56, 69 (1962) ("The
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already operating in California.13 4 The Cali-
fornia Department of Water Resources counts
on availability of these arrangements to meet
the state's demand for water.
135
Conjunctive use in non-adjudicated and
non-monitored basins is risky because the
uncertainty in property rights presents a
loophole for wrongdoers to act and evade re-
sponsibility. For example, who will be liable
if water quality deteriorates as a result of a
conjunctive use arrangement? 36 Who will be
liable if too much water is stored and flood-
ing results? How can non-contracting parties
be sure that adequate room will be reserved
for naturally recharging water to percolate
into the basin for those who claim rights in
percolating basin water but not in the artifi-
cially imported water? 137  How will con-
tracting parties prevent non-contracting
parties from using water that "belongs" to the
contracting parties? 38 Unfortunately, those
desiring to initiate conjunctive use arrange-
ments are unable to incorporate all users into
the agreement to avoid these potential dis-
putes because user rights have not been es-
tablished.
In the past five years, government agents
and a private company, Cadiz, have con-
ducted numerous studies regarding one such
proposed conjunctive use and water market-
ing arrangement involving groundwater be-
neath the Mojave Desert. 39 The Mojave
Desert overlies nine groundwater basins 40
use of groundwater storage for imported water cannot be
completely successful unless the natural local water supply
has been fully adjudicated so that extractions can be con-
trolled and the basin fully managed.").
134. EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLOMOUIST, 1998 PRO-
GRESS REPORT: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CON-
JUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AMOrNG THREE
SOUTHWESTERN STATES (Environmental Protection Agency,
National Center for Environmental Research), at http://es.
epa.gov/ncer/progress/grants/95/water/schlager98.html
(Dec. 19, 2000).
135. The Department notes that "[wlater users in the
Central Valley, Bay Area, and Southern California having
access to major regional conveyance facilities have ... op-
portunities to rely on water marketing arrangements and
conjunctive use options . .." CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES, supra note 6, at ES5-1 1.
136. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 298.
137. Id.
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containing 20 million acre-feet of water
within a 1300 square mile watershed. 14 1 Be-
cause the annual recharge rate is low, experts
believe that the immense quantity of water
now underlying the desert percolated over
thousands of years. 4 2 In 1990 in the north-
western corner of the watershed, the City of
Barstow sued upstream pumpers, alleging
that they overdrafted the groundwater ba-
sin. 143 The Mojave Water Agency cross-com-
plained for an adjudication of water rights in
the watershed. 144 Non-stipulating parties ap-
pealed the physical solution to the California
Supreme Court, which resulted in the City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency decision de-
scribed supra, Part I.D.I. Users who did not
stipulate to the judgment are not bound to
limit their extractions to comport with the
safe yield equation calculated by stipulating
parties. 45 Thus, the future of groundwater in
the northwestern corner remains at risk.
East of the groundwater basins at issue
in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, the
groundwater beneath the Cadiz and Fenner
Valleys is also at risk. Here, too, groundwater
rights have not been adjudicated. Nonethe-
less, Cadiz would like to sell and store water
in the basin underlying its 27,000 acres in a
50 year contract with the MWD. 146 The MWD
has considered contracting with Cadiz to
jointly construct a 35-mile pipeline from a
390 acre man-made basin on the Cadiz prop-
erty to the MWD's Colorado River
138. Id.
139. See infra note 161.
140. Upper, Middle and Lower Mojave River, Harper,
Coyote, Caves, Cronise Valley, Soda, and Silver Lake ba-
sins.
141. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, ABOUT THE PROPOSED
CADIZ PROGRAM, at http://mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh2o.data/site%
20trash/aboutcadiz0l.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
142. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 41.
143. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 96, at
1045.
144. Id.
145. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
146. CADIZ, INC., THE CADIZ GROUNDWATER STORAGE AND
DRY-YEAR SUPPLY PROGRAM, at http://www.cadizinc.com/c/pdf/
O&A%20page .pdf.
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Aqueduct. 47  Under the terms of the pro-
posed agreement, the MWD would be bound
to buy at least 30,000 acre-feet of native
groundwater each year for the first twenty-five
years of the contract, and could elect to
purchase an additional 30,000 acre-feet per
year during that period. 48 In addition, the
MWD could pump up to 150,000 acre-feet per
year of Colorado River water into the aquifer
during wet years, and withdraw that water
during dry years.'
49
Five federal wilderness areas and Joshua
Tree National Park surround Cadiz's property.
Under the implied reservation doctrine, the
United States has the right to water that
originates on or beneath reserved parkland
50
as needed to fulfill the purpose of reserving
the land.' 5' It follows that the federal govern-
ment may claim rights to the groundwater be-
neath Joshua Tree National Park as needed to
sustain the park in its current condition, as-
suming the land was reserved for purposes of
conserving the natural ecosystem. For non-
reserved federal land, which includes the five
wilderness areas, the federal government is
likely to defer to state law to determine how
its water rights will be determined. 52 Unfor-
tunately, California's common law system of
ambiguous usufructory rights does not pro-
147. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, ABOUT THE PROPOSED
CADIZ PROGRAM, supra note 141; see also METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT & BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT REPORT/ ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: CADIZ
GROUNDWATER STORAGE AND DRY-YEAR SUPPLY PROGRAM. SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/
mwdh2o/pages/news/cadiznet/index.htm.
148. SUMMARY OF METROPOLITAN/CADIZ ECONOMIC TERMS
(March 6, 2001) available at http://www.mwd.dst.ca.us/mwdh
2o/pdf/news/Cadizsummaryo I.PDF.
149. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, supra note 141.
150. W. Douglas Karl, Note, Groundwater Rights on Public
Land in California, 35 HASTINGS L.I. 1007, 1010 (1984). ("When
the federal government reserves land [e.g. national parksl
•.. it often expressly or impliedly reserves the water rights
necessary to carry out the purposes of the land reserva-
tion.").
151. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 18.
152. Karl, supra note 150, at 1022. California recog-
nizes appropriation rights to groundwater beneath public
land. Id. at 1027.
153. SCHILLER & FOWLER, supra note 46, at 33 (suggesting
that when water is needed for environmental protection,
tect the public interest in maintaining the
water table at its current level, thereby assur-
ing stability of the desert ecosystem. Con-
serving the desert ecosystem requires
adjudication of public and private rights to
water use to guarantee that Cadiz' project will
not extract water needed to sustain the de-
sert flora and fauna.
53
At least for the short-term, the MWD has
laid concerns about the Mojave Desert
ecosystem to rest with a narrowly approved
board vote on October 8, 2002 to cancel the
Cadiz project. 5 4 After the parties involved
spent nearly five years conducting environ-
mental studies, the MWD voted in the elev-
enth hour to forego the binding contract and
the Cadiz Groundwater Storage and Dry-Year
Supply Program.' 55 The project is allegedly
"the only California-based storage and supply
project to receive all of its federal environ-
mental approvals."' 5 6 However, the MWD
board members cited various reasons for re-
jecting the project, including (1) concern that
environmental questions have not yet been
answered, (2) doubt about Cadiz' financial
stability as a business partner, and (3) uncer-
tainty over the availability of excess Colorado
River water in coming years necessary to
make the conjunctive use project worth-
title to the water should be given to the public agency with
that responsibility).
154. The motion to cancel the project required a 50%
vote of support to pass, and the motion garnered 50.25%
of the MWD board's weighted votes. Michael A. Hiltzik,
MWD Cancels Desert Storage Project, L.A. TIMES, October 9,
2002, at B6.
155. Resources: The Stakes are High - Financially and Politi-
cally - For the Santa Monica Company and its Proposed Partner, the
Metropolitan Water District, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at B3.
156. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program;
Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of Federal Right-of-Way Grant,
Bus. WIRE, October 8, 2002. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice determined that the project will not hurt flora and
fauna; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found
that it complies with the Clean Air Act and will not ad-
versely impact the area's air quality; and the Department of
Interior granted a Record of Decision in August, 2002, for a
right-of-way through federal wilderness land after the Bu-
reau of Land Management worked with the U.S. Geological
Survey and National Park Service to affirm the program's
viability. Cadiz Program Receives Final Federal Environmental Ap-
proval; U.S. Department of the Interior Issues Record of Decision,
Bus. WIRE, August 29, 2002.
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while. 15 7 The MWD has yet to certify the Final
Environmental Impact Report/Environmental
Impact Statement and sign final contracts
with Cadiz.'1
8
However, the Cadiz project may not be
entirely derelict, as Cadiz has stated that it
intends to continue pursuing the project and
believes that the MWD is bound to move for-
ward. 15 9 The MWD's decision to forestall a
conjunctive use project in Mojave gives
policymakers an opportunity to protect the
desert ecosystem and assure responsible
groundwater harvesting by adjudicating pub-
lic and private rights to water use before ar-
ranging for widespread water extraction.
B. Why Opt for a New System of
Adjudication Imposed at the
State Level?
In 1978, the Governor's Commission, rec-
ognizing that California's groundwater is in-
adequately protected by law,16
0
recommended a new system of adjudication
imposed at the state level. 16 1 But narrow in-
terest groups stymied policy-makers and
groundwater reform efforts drowned. In the
twenty-five years since, the groundwater situ-
ation has not improved and the state is still
better positioned than local governments, in
terms of resources and authority, to clarify
157. Hiltzik, supra note 154.
158. Cadiz Program Receives Final Federal Environmental Ap-
proval, supra note 156.
159. Metropolitan Water District Votes on Cadiz Program;
Board Rejects Terms and Conditions of Federal Right-of-Way Grant,
supra note 156.
160. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S Co MM 'N TO REVIEW CALIFOR-
NIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 136 (1978).
161. The Commission recommended dividing the
state into management areas for individual governance by
a local groundwater management authority who may seek
adjudication of rights if management is not otherwise ade-
quate. Id. at 168-69; Deborah A. de Lambert, District Man-
agement for California's Groundwater, II ECOLOGY L.O. 373, 394
(1984); Zachary A. Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater Law:
Past Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform, 20 CAL. W. L. REV.
223, 240-41 (1984); Mallery, supra note 115, at 1298.
162. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.
163. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289; De Lambert,
supra note 161, at 389.
rights in groundwater use. 62 Part II.A, supra,
demonstrated that clarifying property rights
in groundwater via adjudication is imperative.
This section illustrates why a new system of
adjudication is necessary and why it must be
imposed systematically at the state level.
The current adjudicatory system has nu-
merous flaws. First and foremost, individuals
have no incentive to sue until a basin is over-
drafted. 163 The common law correlative rights
doctrine 64 is partly to blame because the law
does not restrict the overlying owner's share
until the basin is overdrafted. So ground-
water "law" does not check water use until
damage to the basin has already occurred.
65
Second, litigants have trouble ascertaining all
the proper parties through the traditional ju-
dicial process. 166 Third, parties have little in-
centive to reach stipulated judgments since
those who do not agree are not bound to the
physical solution and can litigate their
claims. 167 Fourth, adjudication is lengthy and
expensive, and appeals often delay trial
courts' stipulated judgments from becoming
effective for many years.' 68 Fifth, judges im-
pose physical solutions at one point in time,
but may not engineer them to account for
changes in hydrologic conditions and human
impact on water sources. 169 Sixth, since a
court cannot address an issue until a party
164. For an explanation of the correlative rights doc-
trine, see supra Part I. D. I.
165. Mallery, supra note 115, at 1284.
166. De Lambert,' supra note 161, at 390.
167. The California Supreme Court created this nega-
tive incentive when the panel held in City of Barstow that
parties' rights will not be affected (unless mutual prescrip-
tion has been established) if they refuse to sign the stipu-
lated judgment. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1253, 1256 (2000).
168. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 389; Foley-Gan-
non, supra note 27, at 289. For example, the Central Basin
(under San Gabriel River) adjudication cost $585k (in 1965
dollars) and lasted six and 'h years. Blomquist, supra note
121, at 141. Adjudication of the West Basin underlying
western Los Angeles dragged on for 16 years. Id. at 106.
The Tehachapi-Cummings suit took nine years. De Lambert,
supra note 161, at 389 n.106. Adjudicating the basin at is-
sue in San Fernando took twenty years. Id.
169. Trager, supra note 116, at 61.
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raises it, the standard judicial system is not
the ideal forum for effecting reform.'
70
Nonetheless, adjudication affords
groundwater users many benefits. First, adju-
dication makes users' ownership interests
certain and definite. Second, when an extrac-
tor quits pumping, he can sell or lease his
right, instead of just forfeiting it. 17 1 Third,
judges can tailor remedies to the unique at-
tributes of the basins and their users. 172 One
scholar points out that:
lIt] is important to recognize . . .that
the difficulties encountered by
groundwater users in any given loca-
tion will depend in large measure on
the properties of the basin on which
they rely ... The attorneys recognize
and write about how much the physi-
cal characteristics of groundwater ba-
sins differ, and how much those
specific differences matter, while en-
gineers often observe how much the
legal, economic, and political circum-
stances of groundwater basins differ,
and how much these specific differ-
ences matter. 
73
The state has authority and resources to
impose effective adjudication, whereas local
entities do not. 174 The state legislature has
long reserved the right to regulate ground-
water to benefit and protect the public. 75 Be-
cause groundwater moves within a basin,
groundwater management can only be effec-
tive when employed across the entire basin.
In most instances, local entities cannot ac-
170. Sometimes parties assume an issue has been re-
solved when it has not even been addressed. For example,
apparently no one was aware that public entities had im-
munity from mutual prescription based on an amendment
to Civil Code § 1007 until the issue came before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in San Fernando. Blomquist, supra
note 121, at 216.
171. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 55.
172. Foley-Gannon, supra note 27, at 289.
173. Blomquist, supra note 121, at 24, 25.
174. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.
175. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (Deering 2001); see
also CAL. WATER CODE § 12922 (Deering 2001) (declaring the
public interest in protecting groundwater basins from
"overdraft, depletion, sea water intrusion or degraded
water quality.").
complish this task because jurisdictional
boundaries do not comport with basin
boundaries. The state is also better situated
to provide funding and enforce regulations, 176
as the costs of managing groundwater basins




The state legislature must pass ground-
water reform legislation. The new legislation,
the Groundwater Rights Clarification Act
("GRCA"), should go beyond the 1978 Gover-
nor's Commission recommendations, which
offered adjudication as an option for local
management authorities. GRCA should cre-
ate an adjudicatory process to determine the
use rights to all groundwater in California, ex-
empting only the sixteen basins already adju-
dicated.
The Groundwater Rights Clarification Act
should contain the following elements. First,
the state will be divided into management ar-
eas that follow the boundaries of natural ba-
sins. Second, each basin will have its own
management authority (the "Authority").
Third, all basin extractors will be required to
register with the Authority. 7 7 Fourth, the Au-
thority will meter all extractions and keep
pumping logs of the entire basin. The Au-
thority will ascertain the basin's safe yield (if
this is not already known) and assess whether
the basin is overdrafted. 78 Fifth, the Author-
176. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
1050.
177. The Recordation Act already requires this of all
users in four Southern California counties. CAL. WATER
CODE § 4999- 5008 (Deering 2001).
178. The Governor's Advisory Drought Planning Panel
observes that, "Itlhe lack of availability of groundwater
data in various areas of the State ... [is aj significant im-
pediment to fostering cooperative local and regional solu-
tions to water management needs . . . the availability of
groundwater hydrologic data in California lags behind that
of surface water data, in part because of the inherent na-
ture of the resource and to the absence of a statewide sys-
tem of permitting and reporting groundwater extractions."
GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY DROUGHT PLANNING PANEL, supra note 11,
at 4-9.
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ity will file a suit to adjudicate groundwater
user rights in its jurisdiction. Judges with
special expertise in groundwater law will ad-
judicate the rights of each basin, taking into
account claimed priorities and prior use.
179
The equitable apportionment test mentioned
in footnote 61 of the San Fernando case,
quoted supra Part Il.D.l, lists factors the
judges should consider.18 0 GRCA will dictate
how to determine necessary parties, select
the judges, limit venue, fulfill requirements of
notice, set parameters of discovery, and pre-
ordain the use and effect of the stipulated
judgments.'
8 '
GRCA will clarify the rights of all current
and potential users.' 8 2 Civil Code § 1007
must be amended to leave no doubt that mu-
nicipalities' water claims can (and will) be in-
corporated into the basin adjudication.
1 83
Adjudication will assign shares for the "right
to extract" to each pumper. These rights will
be expressed as a percentage of total basin
extraction. The right will be identified in rela-
tion to the rights of others, and:
[Alllocation should be limited to the
natural and artificial recharge amount
but should include enough flexibility
in the same time span selected to al-
low pumping more than annual
recharge in some dry years and to al-
low storage for replenishment in wet
years .... [Slome reduction in the al-
location may be required on a pro
179. Adjudicating rights based on prior use runs the
risk that that users who know this in advance will "race to
the pumphouse." Blomquist, supra note 121, at 353; Garner,
Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at 1026. It is unclear
how this phenomenon can be avoided entirely. Since the
judges will consider other factors besides prior use, per-
haps extractors will doubt the efficacy of racing to the
pumphouse.
180. However, the judges must consider common law
overlying rights and prescriptive priorities as well. In City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency the California Supreme Court
stated that footnote 61 is not "precedent for wholly disre-
garding the priorities of existing water rights in favor of eq-
uitable apportionment ... [Wle have never endorsed a
pure equitable apportionment that completely disregards
owners' existing legal rights." 23 Cal. 4th 1224, 1247-1248
(2000).
181. The Governor's Commission proposed these
streamlining procedures in 1978. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S
Co M M'N TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, supra note
160; De Lambert, supra note 161, at 395-396.
rata basis in order to restrict with-
drawal to safe yield. These reductions
should be set out in terms of reducing
a percentage of accumulated over-
draft over a period in which with-
drawal and recharge can be balanced
and should leave the aquifer with ad-
equate storage room. This should be
made explicit in the original statute
to reduce uncertainty about how re-
ductions will be made.
18 4
After usufructuary rights are adjudicated,
the basin authority may assess pumping
taxes, stipulate proportionate reductions
when necessary to prevent overdrafting, and
facilitate conjunctive use projects. Since the
statute creates defined yet flexible water allo-
cations, the Authority can choose manage-
ment strategies that are appropriate to the
particular characteristics of its basin.'1
5
Local efforts that contradict adjudication
will be preempted by the state statute. There
are currently a number of local groundwater
management programs in the state. "Illn Cal-
ifornia Water Code sections 1220 and 10753,
the Legislature has authorized certain coun-
ties to enact groundwater management plans.
Section 1220 expressly and exclusively ap-
plies to counties. Section 10753 applies only
to counties that meet its specific require-
ments. In combination, however, these two
statutes greatly expand the express power of
counties to control groundwater exports."'
8 6
182. Because the common law does not require over-
lying owners to extract groundwater to maintain their
rights to it, 62 Cal. Jur. 3d § 398 (1981), the Authorities will
name all overlying landowners as parties and the judges
will determine overlying owners' proportion of current and
potential use.
183. To work with the existing common law framework
and bring all extractors to the table, arguably mutual pre-
scription must be applicable to municipal groundwater ex-
tractors. Because the San Fernando court interpreted Civil
Code § 1007 to immunize municipal extractors from pre-
scriptive claims, Civil Code § 1007 should be amended to
clarify that prescriptive rights can be gained against munic-
ipal extractors. See supra, Part I.D.l for a discussion of the
San Fernando Court's modification of the mutual prescrip-
tion doctrine.
184. Smith, supra note 161, at 875.
185. Blomquist, supra note 103, at 53-54.
186. Weber, supra note 62, at 380.
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But the California Constitution, Article Xl,
Section 7 only allows a city or county to make
and enforce local ordinances "not in conflict
with general laws."'18 7 Therefore, locally de-
vised attempts to control groundwater will be
ineffective to the extent they interfere with
the state-mandated adjudication.
B. Why This Approach Can Work
This proposal does not constitute a mas-
sive upheaval of current rights in property,
and it will not result in the taking of private
property. 188 Rights created by the common
law system are not extinguished by this ar-
rangement. Following the California Su-
preme Court's holding in City of Barstow,
priorities will not be ignored, but other con-
siderations will also be relevant. This propo-
sal is pragmatic, recognizing that
adjudicating rights based on priority alone is
not feasible.'8 9 The state-imposed transition
of surface water rights to a permitting scheme
from a riparian/appropriation scheme demon-
strates that it is possible to re-characterize
rights of water use without actually taking the
rights to use water. 90
Furthermore, learning from the lessons
of the past, the proposal can be pitched to
garner support, or at least avoid opposition,
of the farming lobby that defeated the
groundwater rights reform efforts of 1978-
1981.19 A number of scholars have at-
tempted to ascertain the impetus of the
lobby, comprised of the California Cattle-
men's Association, California Chamber of
187. CAL. CONST. Art XI § 7.
188. CAL. CONST. Art I § 19 (West 2002) ("Private prop-
erty may be taken or damaged for public use only when
just compensation . . . has first been paid ...").
189. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal.
4th 1224, 1235 (2000) ("The Itriall court ... concluded that
allocating water based on asserted legal priorities would
be 'extremely difficult, if not impossible."').
190. See, e.g., Mallery, supra note 115, at 1304 n.295.
191. Smith, supra note 161, at 242, 246-50 (suggesting
that agricultural groups succeeded in opposing legislation
and defeated the environmental lobby because of political
campaign contributions, membership size, importance of
farming interests to the state economy, and ability to fi-
nance television campaigns).
Commerce, California Farm Bureau and the
Association of California Water Agencies (col-
lectively referred to herein as the "farming
lobby"). 92 Some believe that the farming
lobby was motivated by a fear of losing local
control to a centralized administration and/or
of losing individual rights (present and fu-
ture) to extract groundwater. 93  Various
members of the farming lobby were optimis-
tic that surface waters could offset overdrafts,
negating the need for groundwater manage-
ment reform. 94 One study revealed that in
California and other states that have pro-
posed groundwater reform bills, some bills
passed and others were denied, not because
of opposition/support for central administra-
tion per se, but because of sentiment about
the particular administration in power at the
time these bills were proposed.
95
The farming lobby must be convinced
that the state will not deny them rights or
control, but give them more rights and con-
trol. The state will not impose particular
management strategies, but only require clar-
ification of usufructuary rights. The system
will better serve current rights claimants be-
cause it will minimize future litigation by
making the law more certain and rights more
specific. Claimants will be guaranteed rights
now so that others cannot gain prescriptive
rights against them later. In addition, author-
ities of adjudicated basins may import sur-
face water to maintain the water table and
prevent overdrafting, keeping the availability
of water at the status quo.
96
192. Zachary A. Smith, Centralized Decisionmaking in the
Administration of Groundwater Rights: The Experience of Arizona,
California and New Mexico and Suggestions for the Future, 24 NAT.
RESOURCES I. 641, 685 (1984); Smith, supra note 161, at 247;
ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 49-52.
193. De Lambert, supra note 161, at 400; ASHLEY &
SMITH, supra note 3, at 50.
194. ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 3, at 50.
195. Smith, supra note 192, at 686-687.
196. This would be more sustainable that the OCSD
importation arrangement, critiqued supra Part ILA, because
users would pay the true cost of importing surface water
and water transfers, made possible because only discreet
rights holders will be entitled to extract water, will likely
result in higher-valued uses of the water.
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Part IV
We know too much about the science of
groundwater, the effects of overdrafting and
the projected water demands of our booming
population to be satisfied with a system that
ignores these facts and promises only uncer-
tainty. Instead of following laws premised on
reality, we have a system resting on the fic-
tion that groundwater is an unlimited com-
mons. It is "perhaps best summarized as the
right to pump as much water as possible until
one is sued."'19 7 California groundwater law
reform is imperative because the current sys-
tem endorses an unsustainable use of limited
resources statewide. The environmental
community and academic circles know this
already, but to pass state legislation, re-
sidents of the state must know this too. We
must convince groundwater extractors and
groundwater consumers that rights adjudica-
tion is in their best interests now.
197. Garner, Ouellette, and Sharff, supra note 93, at
Fall 2002
